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Past, current and projected future population growth is outlined. Barring a calamitous 
pandemic, a further increase in the world’s population from 7 to between 8.8 and 10 
billion by mid-century is unavoidable. This increase is driven by high fertility in sub-
Saharan Africa whose population is forecast to more than double in the next 40 years and 
by a modest rise of 23% in Asia’s huge population. Beyond mid-century, the range of 
plausible demographic destinations widens; much depends on fertility rates in the next 
few decades because they will determine the number of potential reproducers in the 
second half of the century. Vigorous promotion of family planning, particularly in Africa, 
is crucial to achievement of population stabilisation. Unchanged fertility implies a global 
population of 25 billion by the end of the century. In the next few decades the 
contribution of human population growth to global environmental change is moderate, 
because nearly all growth will occur in poor countries where consumption and emission 
of greenhouse gases is low. The implications for food production, and thereby water 
consumption, are greater. Much of the future need for food will be driven by increased 
numbers rather than changing diets. Loss of bio-diversity and natural habitats, 
degradation of fragile eco-systems due to over-exploitation and aquifer deletion are likely 
consequences.  
 
 
The Demographic transition and historical population growth  
 
 
. The rise in human numbers is best understood through the framework of the 
demographic transition. Before this transition births and deaths were approximately in 
balance and population increase was very slow. Life expectancies fluctuating in the range 
of 20 to 40 years were matched by fertility of 4.5 to 6.0 births per woman. On average, 
about two children per couple survived to adulthood, a level that maintains a stable 
population size. Successful reproduction was a lottery; some parents had many surviving 
children, others none. The adjustment to this chance variation was obvious; children 
flowed from those with reproductive excess to those with a deficit through adoption, 
fostering and early apprenticeships. Infanticide was a further post-natal means of 
controlling family size, particularly in Asia.  
 
In the absence of any constraints, it is estimated that, on average, women would have 
about 15 live births. The wide gap between this maximum and observed fertility is 
largely explained by extended breastfeeding that widened inter-birth intervals and by 
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checks on pre-marital sexual access operating in tandem with delayed marriage. Whether 
or not our ancestors practised  forms of birth control is hotly contested. Techniques of 
abortion were certainly known in most pre-transitional societies but the effective ones 
were too dangerous to be used except in extreme situations. The link between coitus and 
conception was recognised and thus abstinence, non-penetrative intercourse, anal 
intercourse and coitus interruptus, at least in principle, were available to those wishing to 
avoid pregnancy, though all except abstinence were probably regarded with moral 
abhorrence in many societies. These ways of avoiding pregnancy may have been 
deployed in times of great hardship to postpone births but their routine widespread use to 
limit family size is a recent phenomenon. 
 
The classic demographic transition model outlines the sequence by which societies are 
transformed from a pre-transitional balance of high mortality and fertility to a new 
balance of low vital rates, though, as discussed later, a post-transitional era in which 
deaths exceed births was not foreseen. The transition is initiated by improvements in life 
expectancy which usher in a period of population growth. After a lag, which varies 
greatly in length, fertility falls, due primarily to increased contraception, but populations 
continue to grow for several decades even after the advent of low fertility, because of the 
effects of age structure, a feature called population momentum. The first phase of 
transition when mortality has declined but fertility remains high gives rise to large 
cohorts of surviving children and, as these swollen cohorts enter the reproductive age 
span, the total numbers of births and the crude birth rate are bolstered even when the 
number of births per couple is small. In the final phase of demographic transition, the 
large cohorts inflate the old-age population; population growth ceases and may even 
become negative.  
 
The crucial role of changing age structure is well illustrated by the case of the 
Republic of Korea (Fig 1).  By 1960, mortality had already declined but fertility remained 
high at about six births per woman and the population was growing at 2.8% per year.  At 
that time, 42% of the total population was aged less than 15 years but only 3% were aged 
65 or more.  In the next 40 years, fertility fell sharply and by 2000 the number of births 
per woman was very low at about 1.4 but the growth rate remained positive at 0.6% per 
year because the percent of all females in the reproductive age span peaked at 57% in the 
last decade of the 20th century.  Between 2000 and 2040 it is projected that the proportion 
of Korea’s population aged 65 or more will rise from 7.4% to 30.5% and the percent of 
females in the reproductive ages will fall from 57% to 35%. 
 
Fig 1 
 
 
The faltering start of demographic transition may be traced back to the 18th 
century. Between the years 1 AD and 1700, human population grew at the imperceptibly 
slow pace of 0.06 % per year, implying a doubling time of 1200 years (Madison 2007). 
This rate accelerated in the 18th century to 0.46% and further to over 0.5% in the next 
century. Much of this early increase occurred in Europe and its overseas settlements and 
reflects the effect on mortality of a combination of rising living standards (and thus 
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improved nutrition) and better control of infectious diseases. Globally, however, life 
expectancy and population growth remained low until the second half of the 20th century. 
Dyson (2010) estimates world life expectancy and the rate of population growth in 1900 
to be 25 years and 0.6%, respectively, rising modestly to 30 years and 0.9% by 1950. 
Thereafter, the pace of change increased dramatically. Mass application of modern 
preventive health measures in the poor countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa and 
better transport to relieve local food shortages resulted in large falls in death rates, 
particularly among infants and children. By 1960, world life expectancy had jumped to 
48 years and continued to improve to reach 67 years in 2010. 
 
Because of these rapid gains in survival following the World War II while fertility 
remained largely unchanged, the rate of population growth peaked in the 1960s at 2% per 
year. The rate then began to drop in response to falling fertility, down to 1.2% in the 
decade 2000-2010. In absolute numbers, the increase in the world’s population peaked 
two decades later in the 1980s when an increment of 850 millions was recorded in a 
decade, a staggering figure that almost equals total world population in 1800 (Figure 2).  
In a mere 50 years, between 1950 and the end of the century, world population rose from 
2.5 to 6.1 billions. 
Fig 2 
 
Population growth in the major world regions over the past 60 years has not been 
uniform (Table 1) At one extreme Europe’s population grew by 35% while, at the other, 
sub-Saharan Africa saw a 4.6 fold increase, followed by the Arab States of North Africa 
with a quadrupling of population. The population of the United States and Canada 
doubled, partly because of a large contribution from migration, while Asia’s population 
trebled and Latin America recorded a 3.5 fold increase. In terms of absolute contribution 
to the global growth of 4.4 billion, Asia dominated, accounting for 63% of the increase 
but this simply reflects the huge baseline size of Asia. In these 60 years the regional 
distribution of population changed radically. For example in 1950 Europe’s population 
was three times larger than that of sub-Saharan Africa. By 2010, it was smaller. 
 
Table 1 
 
Current demographic situation 
 
Key features of the current demographic situation of major regions are shown in 
Table 2. Europe has the lowest fertility, well below the level of two births per woman 
required for long-term stability of population size, though this is offset by heavy net in-
migration.  For much of the past 50 years, annual fertility rates have been depressed by a 
steady increase in women’s age at childbearing. Childbearing ages are now starting to 
stabilize and period fertility, as represented by the total fertility rate, has risen since 2000.  
However, the level of childbearing remains chronically low, between 1.3 and 1.5 births, 
in much of Eastern Europe, Germany, Italy and Spain. In Germany low fertility reflects a 
high level of childlessness, estimated at 30% for the most recent cohort of women to have 
reached the end of reproductive life (Breton and Prioux 2009). In Eastern and Southern 
Europe, the growing acceptance of a one child family is largely responsible. In the 
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absence of migration, a fertility rate sustained at 1.3 births per woman implies, in the long 
term, a halving of population every 44 years while a rate of 1.5 implies a halving every 
66 years. This prospect is welcome to many environmentalists but cause for despondency 
among politicians and economists, who are concerned about the consequences of a 
shrinking labour force that has to support a growing retiree population. Population ageing 
is discussed by Harper in this issue. In Northern America, the other post-transitional 
region, a higher fertility rate and a greater proportionate contribution from migration than 
in Europe act to sustain population growth at nearly 1% per year. 
Table 2 
In Asia, Latin America and Northern Africa, the transition to low mortality and 
fertility is well advanced. Life expectancy is close to 70 years and, in most countries of 
these regions, fertility has fallen from six or more births to below three in the past 50 
years and is still declining. Rates of population growth in Asia and Latin America were 
not much greater in 2005-10 than in Northern America. Though the estimate of annual 
out-migration of 1.5 million for Asia looks large, it has little effect on population size, 
which is growing by 44 millions per year. In Latin America, by contrast, with an annual 
increase of six million, the exodus of about one million per year, mainly to Northern 
America, has acted as a significant brake on population growth.   
Of course, regional averages hide marked inter-country variation and this is 
particularly true in Asia. In Japan, the forerunner of transition in this region, fertility has 
been below replacement level for many years; population growth has ceased and will turn 
negative unless hostile attitudes to in-migration change radically. Similarly, population 
growth is now low in China and the Republic of Korea at 0.5% and is expected to stop in 
about 15 years time. At the other extreme, population growth and fertility remain very 
high in Afghanistan, at 2.6% and 6.6 births, respectively, and also high in Pakistan at 
1.8% and 3.7 births. The northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have a similar 
demographic profile to Pakistan. These two States contain a population of 306 million, 
25% of India’s total. Together with Pakistan’s population of 174 million, they represent 
the main obstacle to population stability in Asia. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the clear regional outlier in terms of demographic 
modernization. Improvements in life expectancy halted between 1980 and 2000 because 
of HIV/AIDS and deteriorating economies. In the past decade, AIDS deaths have fallen 
and many African economies have flourished. Survival has improved but life expectancy, 
estimated to be 52.5 years in 2005-10 remains much lower than in other regions. 
Regional fertility and population growth remain high at about five births and 2.45%, 
though much lower in Southern Africa. 
 
Future prospects 
 
International responsibility for population projections rests with the staff of the  
United Nations Population Division who revise estimates at two-yearly intervals. 
Prudently, in addition to a central, or medium, projection, high and low projections are 
also produced. A constant fertility projection is also available. These projections have 
been made since the 1950s and the accuracy of the medium projection in forecasting total 
world population over a forty year horizon is impressive, with an error typically below 
3% (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000). Errors for specific countries can be large but tend to 
 5 
cancel each other in deriving the global total. The high/low and the medium projection 
projections differ only in the fertility assumption; fertility steadily diverges up/down to 
achieve a difference of 0.5 births per woman from the medium projection over a 15 year 
period and that difference is maintained over the remaining projection period. This highly 
simplified way of representing uncertainty reflects the fact that fertility, not mortality, is 
the main driver of future population size, though a mortality catastrophe that would 
seriously dent the current annual increase of about 75 millions in the world’s population 
cannot be ruled out. 
 
The difference of one birth between high and low projections seems modest and, 
for specific countries, the UN’s spread of possible demographic futures is reasonable. It 
is less so for the world as a whole because it is highly unlikely that all countries would 
experience the same direction of divergence in fertility from the medium trajectory. For 
instance, the low fertility projection is plausible for sub-Saharan Africa but it is extremely 
implausible for those states in Europe and East Asia where the level of childbearing is 
already very low. For this reason, the high and low projections for the world are best 
interpreted as the very outer limits of plausibility. 
 
The 2010 UN projections envisage global population to rise from 6.9 billion in 
2010 to 8.1, 9.3 and 10.6 billion by mid-century under the low, medium or high 
assumptions (UN Population Division 2011). For reasons just outlined, a more realistic 
range might be half as wide, from, say, 8.8 to 9.9 billion. This magnitude of mid-century 
population is probably unavoidable and the narrow band of reasonable estimates could be 
cause for resignation and fatalism. Such attitudes would be both unjustified and 
dangerous. What happens to fertility in the next 40 years has huge implications for the 
final destination of the world’s population because it will determine the number of 
potential reproducers in the second half of the century. By 2100, the medium projection 
gives a population of around 10 billion with modest further growth. The low projection 
indicates a decline to 6.2 billion while the high projection yields a global population of 
15.8 and still increasing. Thus the gap between low and high projections has widened to 
nearly 10 billion; even if this range is arbitrarily halved, the difference is still huge. And 
if fertility remains unchanged at the level of 2005-10, global population would exceed 25 
billion by 2100. Clearly, long-term sustainability of the planet depends on what happens 
to human reproduction in this and the next generation. 
 
Returning to the relative comfort of the UN’s medium projections for the next 40 
years, table 3 shows the likely changes for major regions, together with the total fertility 
rate expected by 2045-50. The fertility assumptions are critical. The recent rise in 
European birth rates is expected to continue. There are sound reasons to doubt this 
scenario but, whatever the eventuality, it will make only a minor difference to the global 
situation. Of far greater consequence is the assumption that in Asia (and Latin America), 
fertility will drop slightly below replacement level. The assumption can muster 
considerable support. China’s fertility will almost certainly remain below-replacement 
level because of rapid urbanization and rising material aspirations. Abandonment of the 
Government’s population control policy is unlikely to make much difference; Chinese 
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populations unaffected by the policy, such as those in Singapore, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, all have extremely low fertility.  
 
Fertility prospects in India, soon to become the world’s most populous nation, are 
less certain. In the four southern States, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra 
Pradesh, replacement level fertility has already been reached and further declines are 
possible. In the most recent national survey of 2005/6, between 26% and 39% of women 
with one child in Kerala, Tamil Nadu , Maharastra and Punjab  reported a desire for no 
more children and the reproductive preferences of husbands were similar (IIPS 2007). 
These figures would be much higher in the absence of the desire to have a son. It appears 
that a one-child family in parts of India may become acceptable, as has already occurred 
in Eastern and Southern Europe and much of East Asia. What happens in the high fertility 
states of northern India and Pakistan, however, depends in part on policies and 
programmes that will be discussed in the next section. 
  
Table 3 
The other really important fertility assumption concerns sub-Saharan Africa. In its 
2008 projections, the UN assumed that fertility would fall from its current level of about 
five births per woman to 2.5 by mid-century. In response to evidence that the fertility 
decline in this region was faltering, the forecast was raised from 2.5 to 3.0 births. A fall 
of two births in 40 years is modest relative to the experience of other regions and may 
prove to be too conservative. Much depends on actions to promote family planning. 
  
The critical contribution of sub-Saharan Africa to global population growth in the 
next 40 years is clearly seen in Table 3. Its population is forecast to more than double, 
accounting for nearly half of the global increase of 2.4 billion. The other big contributor 
is Asia but in this region the percent increase is modest (23%) and much of it is due to 
age structure rather than high fertility. By comparison, the contributions of other regions 
are minor, at least in purely numerical terms, though more important for resource-
consumption and the environment. The population of Europe, despite migration and the 
assumption of rising fertility, is expected to decline slightly but an appreciable increase of 
100 million is forecast for Northern America, largely fuelled by migration. To the extent 
that migrants to USA and Canada adopt the consumption and CO2 emission habits of the 
host population, the environmental impact will be far greater than that implied by the 
mere population numbers. In USA, 70% of adults are overweight. If all countries had the 
same body mass index as in USA, total human biomass would increase by 20% and the 
additional energy requirements would be equivalent to an extra 473 million people of 
average body mass (Walpole et al 2012). 
 
The role of policies and programmes 
 
Increased contraceptive use was undoubtedly the main direct determinant of the 
fertility declines of the past century, though abortion (both legal and illegal) and rising 
marriage ages have also made appreciable contributions. The key policy question 
concerns the extent to which state promotion of modern contraceptive methods can 
accelerate reproductive change in Africa and the remaining high fertility areas of Asia. At 
 7 
the outset, it should be recognized that government-sponsored family planning 
programmes are not a fundamental or necessary cause of fertility decline. After all, 
fertility in many European countries fell to very low levels in the 1930s despite 
government hostility or indifference to contraception and without the benefit of highly 
effective methods. 
 
 More recent examples of steep falls in birth rates in the absence of appreciable 
government intervention include Brazil and Burma. When motives are very strong, 
couples will find ways to control reproduction and, in the absence of legal restrictions, a 
market in contraceptives will emerge. In Brazil, pharmaceutical companies promoted oral 
contraceptives through commercial outlets while doctors performed illicit sterilisations 
under the guise of caesarean sections (Potter et al 2001). This truth lies behind an 
enduring scepticism that programmes can exert more than a trivial influence on 
reproduction ( Pritchett 1994). Instead, it is proposed that investments in child survival, 
education, women’s empowerment and poverty-reduction are better alternatives to 
achieve population stabilisation than investment in family planning. These factors are 
certainly conducive to fertility decline. Improvements in mortality are a pre-condition for 
large sustained falls in fertility and the level of adult education, particularly of women, is 
a strong correlate. However, 40 years of research has failed to identify clear thresholds of 
development that need to be attained before reduced childbearing is possible. It is also 
both patronising and false to assume that poor illiterate couples necessarily need or want 
large numbers of children. It is true that such couples usually do have more children than 
privileged strata but this is largely because unwanted child bearing is higher. Survey data  
from 41 developing countries, show that the poorest quintile experienced on average 1.2 
unwanted births compared with 0.5 births among the richest quintile (Gillespie et al 
2007). 
 
Moreover, abundant evidence has accumulated in the last 40 years that contraception is 
not seamlessly incorporated into reproductive behaviour, whenever the need arises. On 
the contrary, it often encounters serious initial resistance, evoking anxieties, fear and 
even moral outrage at a radical innovation that affects `such a central feature of life 
(Casterline, Sathar and Haque 1991; Ruttenberg and Watkins 1997). These anxieties are 
typically expressed as concerns about the side effects and damage to health of modern 
methods, the most commonly stated reason given for non-use (Sedge et al. 2007).  The 
translation into contraceptive behaviour of motives to postpone or stop childbearing is 
also impeded by lack of information, access and affordability and by unnecessary 
medical restrictions (Campbell, Sahin-Hodogglugil and Potts 2006). 
 
 These barriers are the origin of widespread unmet need for family planning (ie non-use 
among women wanting no child for at least two years), the high proportion of 
pregnancies reported by women in surveys as unintended and resort to illegal and often 
hazardous abortion. The historic rationale of programmes has been to reduce barriers by 
provision of subsidised services and public information campaigns, and fulfilment of 
unmet need has been the main driving force behind increased contraceptive use and 
fertility decline in developing countries (Feyisetan and Casterline 2000). 
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There are thus sound theoretical reasons for believing that government family planning 
programmes can affect fertility but what is the evidence of impact? The effect of national 
programmes cannot be rigorously assessed by randomised control trials though the results 
of localised interventions, including quasi-experiments in Matlab, Bangladesh and 
Northern Ghana, are generally positive (Mwaikambo et al. 2011). The most telling 
evidence comes from natural experiments where a comprehensive programme has been 
introduced in a country, often at the initiative of a committed political leader, while a 
similar country has experienced a weak or non-existent programme. Examples include 
Tunisia and Algeria, Bangladesh and Pakistan, Kenya and Uganda, and Rwanda and 
Burundi (Cleland 1994; Blacker et al 2005; Bongaarts et al 2012). In each pair, the first 
country had a strong programme and recorded an earlier and faster fertility decline than 
the second. The decline in Bangladesh, starting in the 1980s, is of particular significance 
because it shows that programmes can be effective even in the poorest and least educated 
of countries. More recently, Rwanda has replicated the success of Bangladesh; between 
2005 and 2010, fertility fell from 6.1 to 4.6 births per women and use of modern methods 
rose from 10% to 45%, an astonishing pace of change in a poor country with a strong 
Roman Catholic presence.  
 
The example of Kenya in the 1980s demonstrates that family size aspirations can change 
rapidly; in a little more than a decade, average desired family size dropped from 7.2 to 
4.8 children and the percentage of married women stating a desire to stop childbearing 
rose from 16 to 49 percent. This abrupt change suggests that government programmes 
can directly influence desired family sizes. Supporting evidence is weak, but it is likely 
that the advent of reproductive choice, in the form of effective contraception, allows a 
reappraisal of desired number of children which leads to a downwards adjustment. This 
sequence is a crucial consideration in West Africa, where use of modern methods remains 
low and desired family sizes high. In this part of Africa, most unmet need for 
contraception stems from the desire to postpone or space childbearing rather than from 
the desire to cease altogether. In Asia and Latin America, widening inter-birth intervals 
contributed little to overall fertility reduction. Africa, however, may differ. Very long 
birth intervals are largely responsible for the low fertility levels in Southern Africa 
(Moultie, Sayi & Timaeus 2012). 
 
           In sum, the evidence that government family programmes can accelerate, and less 
commonly initiate fertility decline, is convincing. In the past 50 years, no poor and ill 
educated country has experienced a steep and sustained decline in the absence of a strong 
programme. 
 
One reason, then, for the faltering fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa has been 
the failure to implement population policies and promotion of contraception with any 
conviction or high level political support. The reasons for this policy neglect in Africa 
stem in part from the most recent international conference on population held in Cairo in 
1994. Prior to this conference, rapid population growth was rightly seen as a serious 
barrier to socio-economic progress and the promotion of family planning was a well 
funded international development priority. By the early 1990s, considerable progress had 
been made in reducing birth rates, even in some of the poorest countries, such as 
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Bangladesh and Nepal and a sense prevailed that the “population problem” was largely 
solved. Moreover, success had been achieved at a price. Some Asian family planning 
programmes were criticized for single-minded promotion of particular methods in pursuit 
of demographic targets, with little regard for individual choice or the broader issue of 
reproductive health. In response to these considerations, the pre-eminence of family 
planning was replaced at the 1994 conference by a more holistic agenda of women’s 
reproductive and sexual rights and health, in which contraception was merely one of 
many elements. The subsequent demise of family planning as a key development 
intervention was inevitable but was also hastened by the advent of the AIDS pandemic. 
International funding and government priorities within Africa shifted to control of this 
new disease and for much of the past 15 years concerns about population growth and 
family planning programmes were conspicuously absent from international development 
discourse. 
 
This era of neglect may be ending. Two large well-attended conferences on 
family planning have been held in Africa in 2011 and 2012, the first of their kind for well 
over a decade. In London in July 2012, a family planning summit brought together major 
donors and developing country leaders to pledge increased funding and visibility. 
 
Signs of recent, rapid change are already evident in East Africa. In addition to 
Rwanda, contraceptive use among married women in Ethiopia rose from 14% to 27% 
between 2005 and 2011 and in Malawi from 28% to 42% over a similarly short period. If 
the combination of political commitment, international funding and investment to 
improve information and coverage of services that is responsible for success in these 
three countries can be replicated in nearby countries, such as Tanzania and Uganda, the 
UN’s low projection for Eastern Africa will be surpassed. In West Africa the pace of 
change is likely to slower. Adult populations are less well educated, desired family sizes 
higher, access to services more constrained and attitudes to modern methods less 
favourable than in Eastern Africa (Cleland, Ndugwa and Zulu 2011).  
 
Implications of future population growth 
 
A further increase in the world’s population of nearly 2 billion is inevitable even 
if family planning programmes in high fertility countries are re-invigorated. The 
implications for human welfare and the environment are far reaching but also complex, 
contested and uncertain. Some of the major issues are outlined below. 
 
Future population growth will stem almost entirely from the world’s poorest 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia, whose contributions thus far to 
global environmental change has been trivial (Satterthwaite 2010). If the dire poverty of 
these countries persists, then the implications of increased human numbers for planetary 
trends, such as CO2 emissions and ocean acidification, will be modest. In modeling the 
effect of different population scenarios, O’Neill et al. (2010, 2012) use the UN’s 2004 
projections, with high, medium and low mid-century population sizes of 7.4, 8.9 and 10.6 
billions, respectively. Their estimates suggest that total CO2 emissions per year in 2050 
would be reduced by 15% if the low rather than the medium population projection 
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eventuates. However, as the world’s population already exceeds 7 billion and is unlikely 
to fall below 8.8 billion by mid-century, the 15% reduction achievable through slower 
population growth is over-optimistic. Similar results to those of O’Neill are obtained 
from Tim Jackson’s ongoing simulations, cited in Royal Society (2012 pp79-80). Jackson 
no doubt uses more recent population projections but estimates also suffer from the 
unrealistic nature of the UN’s high, medium and low assumptions. 
 
The verdict is clear. Efforts to shape demographic change can make only a modest 
contribution to arresting hazardous trends in the planet’s environment in the next few 
decades. Beyond mid-century the impact of population increase could be considerably 
greater, simply because of the wider divergence in plausible population scenarios. Much 
depends on income and consumption trends in the rapidly growing populations of sub-
Saharan Africa, North India and Pakistan. Economic growth in Africa has accelerated in 
recent years partly because of rising commodity prices but also because improved 
governance has attracted foreign direct investment. Such growth is sorely needed because 
of the imperative to reduce poverty and hunger but it obviously multiplies the potential 
environmental consequences of increased population. Reduction of unintended births by 
promotion of contraception and safe abortion may be one of the most cost effective long 
term ways of mitigating climate change (Wheeler and Hammer 2010)  
 
Population increase has a more immediate and direct link to the need for 
increased food production and associated demand for water. Demand for food is driven 
partly by changing diets but the anticipated rise in the next 40 years of two billion mouths 
to be fed is a major driver.  Conservative forecasts suggest that demand for food will rise 
by 50% over this period compared with population increase of 30%.  Loss of bio-
diversity and natural habitats, degradation of fragile eco-systems due to over-cropping 
and over-grazing and aquifer depletion are likely consequences of this increased demand.  
 
The nexus of population growth, environment, food production and climate 
change presents the most severe challenge in sub-Saharan Africa. The particularly severe 
problems of Sahelian countries are discussed by Potts, Hendersen and Campbell in this 
issue. Agriculture in Africa represents about two-thirds of employment but yields per 
hectare have remained static for decades. Total production barely kept up with population 
growth, with the result that many countries are heavily dependent on grain imports. 
Availability of cropland per person is falling and land degradation is already a problem 
(World Bank 2008). Undoubtedly, technical solutions to these problems could be found; 
the historic neglect of African agriculture is ending. But the combination of climate 
change and  population growth is a formidable obstacle to progress. Three quarters of 
agriculture is rain-fed and is thus vulnerable to increasingly erratic precipitation 
(Pinstrup-Andersen 2002). Moreover, continued temperature rises will diminish yields 
most severely in the tropics (IPCC 2007).  
 
While Africa is the only region where a rise in the rural population is expected, 
most of the increase will occur in cities and towns. Africa’s urban population is projected 
to grow at about 3.5 percent per year for the next 20 years, a rate of increase that implies 
a doubling in size every 20 years. At present about 36 percent of the region’s population 
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is urban but this is projected to reach 56 percent by mid-century. Cities are often the 
engine of economic growth and innovation (Glaeser 2011), though it is uncertain whether 
this characterisation applies in Africa where urbanisation is driven more by rural poverty 
than by the attraction of well paid jobs in manufacturing. UN Habitat (2010) estimates 
that the percentage of Africa’s urban dwellers living in informal settlements, or slums, 
fell from 70 to 62% between 1990 and 2010, though the absolute number doubled. It is 
doubtful whether badly needed improvements in urban infrastructure can match the huge 
projected increase in the urban population. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the absence of a catastrophic mortality crisis, a further increase in the world’s 
population from 7 billion to nearly 9 billion is inevitable. About 40% of this increase will 
be contributed by Asia, where fertility rates are generally low but where the age structure 
sustains the number of births. About 46% will occur in sub-Saharan Africa, the one 
remaining region with high fertility. In this region the range of uncertainty is wider than 
elsewhere and the difference between the UN’s high and low projections amounts to 470 
million by mid-century.  If appropriate policies are adopted and programmes 
implemented, the UN low projection can be achieved and even surpassed. 
 
In addition to the environmental benefits of an accelerated transition to population 
stabilization in Africa, large health, social and economic benefits would be realized.  The 
number of women dying in childbirth would be cut and child health and education would 
improve. The ratio of adults to dependent children would rise, creating an opportunity to 
invest more in agriculture and industry. The promotion of contraception and legitimation 
of smaller family sizes needs to be one of the top priorities in this region. 
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Figure 2
Increase in Population by Decade, in Millions
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Region Population 
1950 (millions) 
Population 
2010 (millions) 
Absolute 
increase 
(millions) 
Ratio 
2010/1950 
Europe 547 738 191 1.35 
Northern 
America 
172 345 173 2.00 
Asia 1403 4146 2743 2.96 
Latin America 167 590 423 3.53 
Oceania 13 36 23 2.77 
North Africa 53 209 156 3.94 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
186 856 670 4.60 
World 2532 6896 4364 2.72 
 
Table 1 Population Growth in Major Regions 1950-2010 
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Region Life expectancy Total fertility Annual net 
migration 
(000s) 
Population 
growth rate 
Europe 75 1.53 1809 0.20 
Northern 
America 
78 2.03 1202 0.91 
Asia 69 2.28 -1568 1.08 
Latin America 73 2.30 -1047 1.15 
Oceania 77 2.49  223 1.75 
North Africa 69 2.97 -204 1.74 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
52 5.10 -397 2.45 
World 68 2.52  0 1.16 
 
Table 2 Demographic Indicators for Major World Regions (2005-2010) 
 
 
 
 
Region Population 
size 
(millions) 
2010 
Population 
size 
(millions) 
2050 
Absolute 
change 
2010-2050 
(millions) 
Ratio 
2050/2010 
Assumed 
total fertility 
2045-50 
Europe 738 719 -19 0.97 1.91 
Northern 
America 
344 447 103 1.30 2.07 
Asia 4,164 5,142 978 1.23 1.88 
Latin 
America 
590 731 161 1.27 1.79 
Oceania 36 55 19 1.53 2.21 
North Africa 209 332 113 1.54 2.03 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
856 1,960 1,101 2.29 3.00 
World 6,896 9,306 2,419 1.35 2.17 
 
 
Table  3. Population Growth 2010-2050 (United Nations Medium Projection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
